deployment-diagram
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local shell scripts,
scripts/new-canvasandscripts/tq, which use system commands likecp,mkdir, andopen -ato manage diagram files andcurlto communicate with the local tldraw server. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs and sends JavaScript code snippets to the tldraw application's local API (specifically the
/api/searchand/api/doc/:id/execendpoints) to programmatically manipulate the canvas, create shapes, and manage pages. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from user prompts (infrastructure descriptions) and from the tldraw API (existing canvas shapes). It lacks explicit boundary markers or sanitization logic, creating a surface where malicious instructions embedded in the infrastructure description or canvas metadata could potentially influence agent behavior during the diagramming workflow.
- Ingestion points: User-provided prose/lists in
SKILL.md(Workflow Step 1) and canvas state retrieved viaapi.getShapesinreferences/shared/bridge.md. - Boundary markers: None identified in the instruction set.
- Capability inventory: Execution of shell scripts (
scripts/new-canvas,scripts/tq) and local network requests viacurl. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of input data is described beyond normalization to a JSON schema.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's documentation references the official tldraw website (
offline.tldraw.com) for application setup andtldraw.devfor API documentation, which are well-known services associated with the skill's functionality.
Audit Metadata