whitepaper
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute local shell scripts included in the package, specifically
scripts/new-canvasandscripts/tq, to manage the tldraw application lifecycle and perform API requests. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local configuration data to retrieve security credentials.
- Evidence: The
scripts/tqhelper andreferences/shared/bridge.mddocumentation describe readingserver.jsonfrom sensitive paths (e.g.,~/Library/Application Support/tldraw/server.json) to extract anauthorization tokenandport. While intended for local communication withlocalhost, this pattern involves handling active authentication tokens. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of dynamically generated code within an external application environment.
- Evidence: The skill provides instructions for sending JavaScript payloads to the
/api/doc/:id/execand/api/doc/:id/script-workspaceendpoints to manipulate the tldraw canvas and register durable document scripts. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its data processing workflow.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read repository source code and user-provided materials to generate factual whitepaper content (
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when processing this external content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to shell script execution and a local API capable of running JavaScript within the tldraw application.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the ingested repository data before it enters the agent's context.
Audit Metadata