same-idea-both-platforms

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input, such as ideas or existing posts, to generate drafts for Twitter and LinkedIn. This creates a potential surface where adversarial instructions in the input could attempt to trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions.
  • Ingestion points: The skill ingests user content during Step 1 (finding the idea) and when adapting posts between platforms as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety markers to isolate user-provided text from the agent's core instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes external tools publish_post and schedule_post which perform state-changing actions on social media platforms.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, filtering, or validation of the user-provided input is specified.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill references tools that perform external actions, specifically for publishing content to third-party social media services.
  • Evidence: The workflow mentions publish_post and schedule_post tool calls for interacting with Twitter and LinkedIn profiles.
  • Mitigation: The skill includes explicit security instructions for the agent to never execute these calls autonomously. It requires a "clear yes" from the user and separate approvals for each platform to ensure human oversight.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 6, 2026, 07:23 AM