codex
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the download of configuration and installation scripts from OpenAI's official
chatgpt.comdomain. These downloads includeinstall.shfor Unix-like systems andinstall.ps1for Windows, which are standard for the Codex CLI setup. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves executing scripts fetched from the
chatgpt.comservice. The skill directs the agent to obtain host-policy authorization before execution and prefers installing to user-local directories like~/.local/bin. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The core logic involves running the
codexbinary with various subcommands and flags. This includes executing model-generated prompts viacodex exec, performing code reviews viacodex review, and managing environments through worktree and session subcommands. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-defined prompt strings and passes them to the
codex execcommand for processing. While this creates a vulnerability surface for indirect injection attacks, the skill incorporates several defensive measures. - Ingestion points: User-supplied prompts used in
SKILL.mdand referenced inreferences/streaming.md. - Boundary markers: The skill defines specific sandbox modes (
read-only,workspace-write) to limit the impact of model-generated shell commands. It also mandates 'waivers' for bypassing standard approval steps. - Capability inventory: The underlying
codextool has significant capabilities, including shell execution, file system modification, and network access (implied by MCP and plugin management). - Sanitization: Prompt content is literal-quoted when building the command-line arguments to prevent shell meta-character injection during the initial process launch.
Audit Metadata