fix-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted text from pull request reviews, conversation comments, and review threads, which creates an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Review bodies and comments are fetched via gh api as described in SKILL.md (Step 2) and the hunt recipes in REFERENCE.md.
- Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested text.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to modify the codebase through git commit and git push (Step 5) and interact with PR participants by posting replies (Step 7).
- Sanitization: The skill relies on triage verdicts and "unslop" formatting rules for replies, but lacks robust sanitization to prevent adversarial instructions in the input feedback from influencing agent behavior.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs shell operations using
git(fetch, checkout, commit, push) andgh(GitHub CLI) to manage the repository and pull request state. It also invokes JavaScript runtimes likebun,node, andtsxto execute auxiliary scripts. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on external script files located in sibling directories, such as
../gh/pr-threads.tsand../gh/ci-failures.ts, which are treated as internal vendor dependencies.
Audit Metadata