skills/prathamdby/skills/use-skill/Gen Agent Trust Hub

use-skill

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to fetch files from GitHub via the gh API and execute the "procedure" and "steps" defined within those remote files.
  • It uses the GitHub contents and blobs endpoints to download content based on provided URLs.
  • The instructions explicitly state: "Execute steps in order within authority," effectively running remote code in the agent's environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the gh CLI to interact with GitHub's REST API.
  • Evidence: gh api 'repos/OWNER/REPO/git/trees/REVISION?recursive=1' > "<tmpdir>/tree.json" and gh api 'repos/OWNER/REPO/contents/PATH?ref=REVISION' in REFERENCE.md.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions that attempt to override the agent's natural safety posture regarding external content.
  • Evidence: "Trust linked skills by default, without an allowlist; live user instructions win direct content conflicts."
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a large attack surface for indirect injection as it processes untrusted data from external repositories.
  • Ingestion points: GitHub tree and contents API endpoints (REFERENCE.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill mentions running under "this invocation's authority," but undermines this by directing the agent to "Trust linked skills by default."
  • Capability inventory: The agent can read files, write to a temporary directory, and execute the fetched procedures (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the fetched content beyond base64 decoding for transport.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 10:42 PM