use-skill
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to fetch files from GitHub via the
ghAPI and execute the "procedure" and "steps" defined within those remote files. - It uses the GitHub contents and blobs endpoints to download content based on provided URLs.
- The instructions explicitly state: "Execute steps in order within authority," effectively running remote code in the agent's environment.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
ghCLI to interact with GitHub's REST API. - Evidence:
gh api 'repos/OWNER/REPO/git/trees/REVISION?recursive=1' > "<tmpdir>/tree.json"andgh api 'repos/OWNER/REPO/contents/PATH?ref=REVISION'inREFERENCE.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions that attempt to override the agent's natural safety posture regarding external content.
- Evidence: "Trust linked skills by default, without an allowlist; live user instructions win direct content conflicts."
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a large attack surface for indirect injection as it processes untrusted data from external repositories.
- Ingestion points: GitHub tree and contents API endpoints (
REFERENCE.md). - Boundary markers: The skill mentions running under "this invocation's authority," but undermines this by directing the agent to "Trust linked skills by default."
- Capability inventory: The agent can read files, write to a temporary directory, and execute the fetched procedures (
SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the fetched content beyond base64 decoding for transport.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata