archive-crawler

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses external command-line utilities to extract text from legacy document formats and Outlook archives found in user backups.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md contains implementation instructions for using antiword, catdoc, and readpst to parse file content. Notably, readpst is directed to write to /tmp/pst-output, which is outside the skill's declared writes_to directories.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs Python one-liners to perform runtime parsing of archive metadata and modern document structures.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md specifies the use of python3 -c for validating .pst file headers and extracting text from .docx files by parsing internal XML structures within the ZIP container.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As a tool designed to ingest large amounts of unstructured personal data, the skill is susceptible to instructions embedded within the scanned files.
  • Ingestion points: Reads content from .mbox, .doc, .docx, and .pst files across multiple user-defined source types (local, Dropbox, B2).
  • Boundary markers: The skill tracks state in a STATUS.md manifest, but does not define explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded prompts when presenting raw file content to the agent for triage.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can write to originals/, personal/, and ideas/ directories and execute shell commands to parse files.
  • Sanitization: The skill logic includes stripping HTML tags for display but lacks a comprehensive sanitization strategy for other potentially malicious text formats.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 29, 2026, 06:18 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — archive-crawler