cold-start
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function involves importing data from untrusted external sources, which constitutes a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from Gmail messages, calendar event details, Twitter archives, and conversation logs from other AI services (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The instructions describe logic for filtering 'noise' and automated notifications but do not specify the use of delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded prompts during the ingestion process.
- Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to write to multiple brain directories (people/, conversations/, etc.), modify system timelines, and execute shell commands via the
gbrainCLI tool. - Sanitization: There are no mentioned mechanisms for sanitizing or escaping the imported text before it is stored in the knowledge base and subsequently retrieved by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to run various shell commands for local environment discovery and data management.
- Evidence: The agent uses shell snippets containing
find,du, andwcto discover markdown repositories, and executes thegbrainCLI for importing files and extracting links.
Audit Metadata