resolve-before-asking
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates by ingesting data from untrusted external sources, which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through
gbrain query(which accesses email archives, chat transcripts, and calendar imports) and external web search results. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not mandate the use of delimiters or specific safety instructions to isolate external content from the agent's core logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
gbrainCLI suite for data synthesis and possesses write permissions for thepeople/andcompanies/directories. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or filtering external content before it is synthesized or written to the internal database.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for using a specific suite of CLI tools to perform complex data lookups and graph operations.
- Evidence: Documented use of
gbrain think,gbrain search,gbrain get,gbrain query,gbrain sources,gbrain timeline,gbrain backlinks, andgbrain graphto synthesize information from the internal database.
Audit Metadata