skill-autobench
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to read from sensitive local directories including user conversation archives (
conversations/) and project transcripts (e.g.,~/.claude/projects/). This access is explicitly declared in the frontmatter and is essential for the skill's primary function of mining usage history to build benchmarks. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes platform-specific CLI tools to perform history searches, query data, and execute multi-model evaluations. These appear to be legitimate platform-local utilities for skill management.
- Evidence: Use of
gbrain search,gbrain query,gbrain transcripts,gbrain skillopt, andgbrain eval cross-modalcommands. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from user conversation history, which could contain instructions intended to manipulate the generated evaluation criteria.
- Ingestion points: Ingests data from the
conversations/directory and various transcript files. - Boundary markers: The skill enforces separation of sources using
HISTORY-IMPLIEDandSPEC-DERIVEDlabels to clearly identify when evidence is derived from potentially untrusted user history. - Capability inventory: The skill can write files to the
skills/<name>/eval/directory and execute subprocesses via thegbraintool suite. - Sanitization: The instructions mandate a privacy scrub to replace all real names and entities with placeholder slugs (
alice-example,acme-example) before staging output, and requires a human gate before final merging.
Audit Metadata