testing
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMMETADATA_POISONINGCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill's YAML frontmatter explicitly sets
mutating: false, suggesting that the agent will not make changes to the filesystem. However, the 'Auto-fix protocol' in the body instructions specifically directs the agent to update tests and fix imports, creating a deceptive safety profile. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to execute shell commands such as
bun test,git log, andgbrain doctorto perform its primary function of project validation and health monitoring. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and acting upon data from external tool outputs.
- Ingestion points: Output from the
bun test,git log --oneline, andgbrain doctor --fast --jsoncommands. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are provided to isolate untrusted tool output from the agent's logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows shell execution and file modification (via the auto-fix protocol).
- Sanitization: The agent is instructed to classify failures and apply fixes directly from parsed logs without explicit sanitization or validation steps.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and writes state information to a file in the user's home directory (
~/.gbrain/test-state.json), which exposes system-level data outside of the immediate project environment.
Audit Metadata