testing

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMMETADATA_POISONINGCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill's YAML frontmatter explicitly sets mutating: false, suggesting that the agent will not make changes to the filesystem. However, the 'Auto-fix protocol' in the body instructions specifically directs the agent to update tests and fix imports, creating a deceptive safety profile.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to execute shell commands such as bun test, git log, and gbrain doctor to perform its primary function of project validation and health monitoring.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and acting upon data from external tool outputs.
  • Ingestion points: Output from the bun test, git log --oneline, and gbrain doctor --fast --json commands.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are provided to isolate untrusted tool output from the agent's logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill allows shell execution and file modification (via the auto-fix protocol).
  • Sanitization: The agent is instructed to classify failures and apply fixes directly from parsed logs without explicit sanitization or validation steps.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and writes state information to a file in the user's home directory (~/.gbrain/test-state.json), which exposes system-level data outside of the immediate project environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 29, 2026, 06:18 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — testing