tech-design
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands (
grep,git) using variables likeNNN-slugderived from directory names and user input. The lack of explicit sanitization instructions for these variables could potentially lead to command injection if a directory name contains shell metacharacters. \n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes content fromspec.mdand other project files which are considered untrusted inputs. \n - Ingestion points: Specification files (
meta/specs/NNN-slug/spec.md), project conventions (AGENTS.md), and rule files (.claude/rules/). \n - Boundary markers: The protocol does not define delimiters or specific instructions to disregard instructions embedded within the spec files. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill can write to the file system (
spec.md), execute shell commands (git,grep), and spawn additional subagents. \n - Sanitization: There are no requirements to sanitize or escape the content of the specification before it is used to influence the design or the logic of subagents. \n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically spawns various subagents (
Opus subagents,propose-alternatives,deep-modules,find-gaps) to handle different parts of the design and verification process based on the input specification's complexity.
Audit Metadata