mcp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a bridge to external applications (e.g., Notion, Slack, Linear), which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection. Malicious instructions stored within external documents or messages could be processed by the agent when calling these tools.
- Ingestion points: Data returned from
mcp.call_tooland metadata (schemas/descriptions) frommcp.describe_toolandmcp.list_plugins. - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly define delimiters or specific "ignore" instructions for data returned from external MCP servers.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows discovery and execution of any tools provided by the user's connected MCP services, which may include broad read/write permissions.
- Sanitization: The skill returns parsed Python objects directly from the service providers without specific instructional filtering or sanitization.
- [SAFE]: The skill enforces several security best practices:
- Credential Safety: It explicitly instructs the agent to never request credentials via environment variables and directs the user to platform-native login flows.
- Restricted Autonomy: The skill is designed to prevent the agent from initiating new service connections, requiring manual user intervention via the host interface.
- Error Handling: It includes specific handling for
PermissionError(honoring user-defined tool policies) and flags errors when servers provide incomplete or untrustworthy inventory data.
Audit Metadata