primitive-chat

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions direct the agent to send emails without seeking user confirmation when interacting with specific address prefixes such as help@, support@, or docs@. This encourages autonomous external communication that bypasses the user's explicit consent for outgoing data.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides a mechanism to send messages and data to external email addresses. While this is the intended functionality, it establishes a communication channel to third-party servers managed by the vendor.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of multiple shell commands to manage account signup, verification, and message transmission via the primitive CLI tool.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation process involves downloading and globally installing the @primitivedotdev/cli package from the NPM registry. It also mentions using npx to add the skill, which executes remote code.
  • [SAFE]: (Indirect Prompt Injection) The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external email replies.
  • Ingestion points: Email reply content returned by the primitive chat command as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: None identified; external content is processed directly by the agent without delimiters or warnings.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to execute shell commands, install packages, and perform network operations via the CLI (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of the email reply content is documented before the agent processes the data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 9, 2026, 09:16 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — primitive-chat