worklog
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local scripts to execute system utilities for project and session management.
- Evidence:
scripts/new-worklog.tsexecutesgit rev-parse --show-toplevelto locate the repository root. - Evidence:
scripts/find-current-session.tsandscripts/get-session-transcript.tsinvokesqlite3andopencodeto search and export session history. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's scripts rely on the
tsxpackage, which may be dynamically downloaded during execution. - Evidence: The scripts contain a shebang line
#!/usr/bin/env -S npx tsx, which instructs the system to usenpxto runtsx, potentially fetching it from the NPM registry if not present locally. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads sensitive session history from the user's home directory to generate logs.
- Evidence:
scripts/get-session-transcript.tsaccesses directories such as~/.claude/projectsand~/.local/share/opencodeto retrieve full session transcripts. Although the data is used locally, it involves reading the complete history of the user's interaction with the AI. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes session transcripts, which are untrusted data sources that could contain malicious instructions intended for the agent.
- Ingestion points: Session transcripts are read from disk by
get-session-transcript.ts. - Boundary markers: A sub-agent brief defined in
assets/extraction-brief.mdprovides structural instructions and section headers for the extraction process. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write the extracted content to the project's file system in the
.worklogs/directory. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the transcript content is performed before it is provided to the sub-agent for processing.
Audit Metadata