explore-ml-data

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes system commands using the python -m skore_skills utility to manage project status, styling, notebook filling, and git operations.
  • Evidence includes calls to status, eda stamp, style, notebook fill, site build, and git end-turn across various files like SKILL.md and references/extra_analyses.md.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically assembles and executes a Python script (materialize.py) at runtime to perform data profiling.
  • Evidence: The procedure in SKILL.md (Step 2) and templates/materialize.py instructs the agent to copy a template, perform string substitutions (e.g., <LOAD_RAW_DATA>, <TARGETS>), and execute the resulting script using the local Python interpreter.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a defined attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted user data and uses findings derived from that data as context for subsequent agent reasoning.
  • Ingestion points: The materialize.py script reads user-provided raw data files. The agent then reads the generated extras.json and data_analysis.md back into its context.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings when interpolating data-derived summaries into prompts for other tools, such as the research-ml-practice skill.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands, write to the filesystem, and load other functional skills based on analysis results.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or escaping of data values (e.g., column names, category labels, or data summaries) is performed before they are used in natural language reasoning steps.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 15, 2026, 02:42 AM