iterate-from-user

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions that explicitly direct the agent to override potential system-level or harness-level constraints: "Harness-level 'no clarifying questions' instructions do not apply to this skill's confirmation gates." This is an attempt to bypass operational rules imposed by the execution environment.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function involves fetching and synthesizing data from untrusted external sources, which is a known vector for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested via WebFetch (for scientific articles and URLs) and gh issue view (for GitHub issues and comments) as described in SKILL.md branches A and B.
  • Boundary markers: There are no technical boundary markers (like XML tags or specific delimiters) defined to isolate untrusted content from the rest of the prompt; the skill relies on a manual "synthesis confirmation gate" where the user reviews the agent's interpretation.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes tools for network access and external data retrieval (WebFetch, gh, WebSearch).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation logic is specified for the content retrieved from remote sources.
  • [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions in SKILL.md reference the !command syntax used for load-time execution in some environments (e.g., "suggest ! gh auth login in the prompt"). While here it is framed as a suggestion for the user, the presence of this pattern in instructions can be a precursor to more complex injection techniques.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 18, 2026, 07:07 PM