code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from git diffs, commit messages, and external specification files to generate prompts for its sub-agents. An attacker could potentially include malicious instructions within a code diff or a spec file to influence the agent's behavior or output.
- Ingestion points: File SKILL.md (Git diff output, commit logs, and files retrieved from
docs/,specs/, or.scratch/directories). - Boundary markers: The instructions for prompting the sub-agents lack explicit delimiters or markers to separate untrusted content from the agent's instructions, increasing the risk of the agent obeying embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
git diff,git log, andgit rev-parse, along with general file reading capabilities. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering is performed on the ingested content before it is used to construct prompts for the sub-agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell-based
gitcommands to resolve references and retrieve diffs. While it attempts to validate references usinggit rev-parse, the security of these operations depends on the platform's ability to prevent command injection from user-supplied branch or commit names.
Audit Metadata