ads-generate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses configuration and metadata files within the user's home directory.
- Evidence: The instructions involve reading from and writing to
~/.banana/presets/,~/.banana/costs.json, and~/.claude/skills/ads/references/to manage generation parameters and tracking spend. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external files to drive agent behavior and task spawning.
- Ingestion points: Processes
campaign-brief.mdfor generation instructions andbrand-profile.jsonfor style attributes. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or isolation instructions are specified to prevent the agent from following malicious commands embedded within the campaign briefs.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to spawn new agent tasks (
visual-designer,format-adapter) with shared context, write multiple files to the local directory, and invoke thebanana-claudeimage generation tool. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content extracted from the brief files before it is used to construct prompts for sub-agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill references a local Python script as a fallback execution path.
- Evidence: Mentions
scripts/generate_image.pyas a deprecated alternative if the primary image provider tool is unavailable.
Audit Metadata