inboundfy-growth-anuncios
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from multiple external project files and user-supplied inputs, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill explicitly reads from several files including
.inboundfy/context/empresa.md,.inboundfy/estrategia.md,.inboundfy/context/marca-voz.md,.inboundfy/context/publico.md,.inboundfy/context/proibicoes.md,.inboundfy/context/glossario.md, and.inboundfy/pipeline.mdas specified inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters, XML tags, or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are utilized to isolate the content of these files from the agent's execution logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill's capabilities are limited to text generation, file updates (Brief/ID preservation), and calling other internal skills (
inboundfy-setup,inboundfy-anti-slop). No dangerous capabilities like network exfiltration, arbitrary shell execution, or privilege escalation were found. - Sanitization: While the skill invokes
inboundfy-anti-slopandinboundfy-copy-edicaofor editorial review, there is no technical sanitization or schema validation mentioned to prevent processing malicious instructions embedded in the project files.
Audit Metadata