pdf

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process user-provided PDF files through various extraction and manipulation scripts. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in PDF text, metadata, or form fields to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads external PDF files in forms.md (via check_fillable_fields, extract_form_field_info.py, convert_pdf_to_images.py) and SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to the agent to ignore or delimit potentially untrusted content within the processed PDFs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to write files (pypdf's PdfWriter.write) and execute shell commands via command-line tools like pdftotext and qpdf.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the content extracted from the PDFs is performed before it is processed by the agent.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py utilizes runtime monkeypatching to address a known bug in the pypdf library regarding the retrieval of inherited field attributes. While this is a targeted fix for a specific library issue, it represents a form of self-modifying code at runtime.
  • Evidence: The monkeypatch_pydpf_method function in scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py (lines 78-95) dynamically replaces DictionaryObject.get_inherited with a custom implementation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 7, 2026, 07:41 AM