Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process user-provided PDF files through various extraction and manipulation scripts. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in PDF text, metadata, or form fields to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads external PDF files in
forms.md(viacheck_fillable_fields,extract_form_field_info.py,convert_pdf_to_images.py) andSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to the agent to ignore or delimit potentially untrusted content within the processed PDFs.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to write files (
pypdf'sPdfWriter.write) and execute shell commands via command-line tools likepdftotextandqpdf. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the content extracted from the PDFs is performed before it is processed by the agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyutilizes runtime monkeypatching to address a known bug in thepypdflibrary regarding the retrieval of inherited field attributes. While this is a targeted fix for a specific library issue, it represents a form of self-modifying code at runtime. - Evidence: The
monkeypatch_pydpf_methodfunction inscripts/fill_fillable_fields.py(lines 78-95) dynamically replacesDictionaryObject.get_inheritedwith a custom implementation.
Audit Metadata