skill-sync
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
sync.shscript aggregatesauto_invokemetadata from all skills within the repository and injects this content intoAGENTS.mdfiles. This architectural pattern creates a vulnerability surface where a malicious or compromised skill could inject instructions that are then promoted to repository-level agent guidelines. - Ingestion points: Metadata fields (
auto_invoke,scope) are extracted fromskills/*/SKILL.mdfiles insync.shusingawkandsed. - Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bash,Read, andWritetools to perform repository-wide modifications toAGENTS.mdand related documentation files. - Boundary markers: Content is injected under a standard
### Auto-invoke Skillsheader, but the instructions do not include explicit delimiters or warnings for the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded instructions in the metadata. - Sanitization: The synchronization logic performs basic string cleaning such as quote removal and whitespace trimming, but it does not validate or sanitize the semantic content of the
auto_invokestrings before writing them to the destination files.
Audit Metadata