notebooklm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill captures Google authentication cookies by automating a Chrome browser and stores them in a local file for session persistence.
- Evidence:
scripts/cookie-store.tsmanages the collection of sensitive cookies (SID, HSID, etc.) and their storage in acookies.jsonfile. - Security control: The skill applies restricted file permissions (
0o600) to the credential file on Unix-like systems to prevent unauthorized local access. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local commands to launch and interact with a browser process via the Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP).
- Evidence:
scripts/auth.tsuseschild_process.spawnto launch Chrome or Chromium with debugging flags like--remote-debugging-port. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads generated media and data artifacts from Google's official infrastructure.
- Evidence:
scripts/rpc-client.tscontains logic to fetch files fromnotebooklm.google.comandlh3.googleusercontent.com. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing untrusted data from user-specified notebooks.
- Ingestion points: Notebook source content is retrieved via RPC calls in
scripts/main.tsandscripts/rpc-client.ts. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit boundary markers or "ignore instructions" warnings when extracting content from notebook sources.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write various file types to the local disk and perform network requests to Google domains.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the content retrieved from NotebookLM before it is processed for artifact generation.
Audit Metadata