generation-diversity
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download and install related generative components from the author's official GitHub repository (
PrunaAI/pruna-skills) using thenpx skills addcommand. These are vendor-owned resources used for modular skill management. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to perform local media operations using
ffmpegfor clip concatenation and audio mixing, and to use thenpxpackage runner to manage the installation of required skill dependencies. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a potential surface for indirect injection by ingesting untrusted user briefs (
BRIEF.mdor chat input) and interpolating that data into prompts for generative models. - Ingestion points: User-supplied creative briefs, brand manifests, and manifest log files (
SKILL.md,references/clarification-intake.md). - Boundary markers: The skill suggests a 'brief lock' phase to verify user requirements but does not explicitly mandate strict delimiters (e.g., XML tags or unique markers) around user-supplied content within the generated prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill calls external generative APIs (
POST /v1/predictions), executes local media assembly viaffmpeg, and performs network operations to poll for asset completion. - Sanitization: No explicit character escaping or safety filtering of the input brief is described before it is formatted into the final generative prompt.
Audit Metadata