learning-aggregator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from multiple sources which can be influenced by external inputs or previous malicious interactions.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads data from
.learnings/LEARNINGS.md,ERRORS.md,FEATURE_REQUESTS.md,HEALS.md, and session traces via theentireCLI tool, as detailed in Step 1 and the Session Trace Analysis section ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or delimiters for the summaries and details extracted from logs when producing the Gap Report.
- Capability inventory: The resulting Gap Report is used by the
harness-updateragent to modify project instruction files (such asCLAUDE.mdandAGENTS.md) and by theeval-creatorskill to generate test cases. - Sanitization: There is no documented sanitization or validation process for the 'Summary' or 'Details' fields extracted from log entries before they are included in the promotion recommendations.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
entirecommand-line interface to perform deep trace analysis of session history. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdspecifies the use of shell commands to query session data, includingentire --version,entire rewind --list, andentire explainwith various flags for checkpoint and transcript retrieval.
Audit Metadata