learning-aggregator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from multiple sources which can be influenced by external inputs or previous malicious interactions.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads data from .learnings/LEARNINGS.md, ERRORS.md, FEATURE_REQUESTS.md, HEALS.md, and session traces via the entire CLI tool, as detailed in Step 1 and the Session Trace Analysis section of SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or delimiters for the summaries and details extracted from logs when producing the Gap Report.
  • Capability inventory: The resulting Gap Report is used by the harness-updater agent to modify project instruction files (such as CLAUDE.md and AGENTS.md) and by the eval-creator skill to generate test cases.
  • Sanitization: There is no documented sanitization or validation process for the 'Summary' or 'Details' fields extracted from log entries before they are included in the promotion recommendations.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the entire command-line interface to perform deep trace analysis of session history.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md specifies the use of shell commands to query session data, including entire --version, entire rewind --list, and entire explain with various flags for checkpoint and transcript retrieval.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 27, 2026, 09:18 PM