learning-aggregator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from various sources which can influence agent behavior in future sessions.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads entries from
.learnings/(LEARNINGS.md, ERRORS.md, etc.) and session traces via theentireCLI tool (SKILL.md, Step 1 and Session Trace Analysis section). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions within the processed log entries or traces.
- Capability inventory: The resulting 'Gap Report' is designed to be consumed by the
harness-updateragent, which applies changes to project instruction files such asCLAUDE.md,AGENTS.md, and.github/copilot-instructions.md(SKILL.md, Step 5). - Sanitization: The skill lacks mechanisms to sanitize or validate the content of log entries before they are recommended for promotion into system-level instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute several shell commands using the
entireCLI tool to fetch and analyze session data. - Evidence: Commands include
entire --version,entire rewind --list, andentire explainwith various flags (SKILL.md, Session Trace Analysis section).
Audit Metadata