self-healing-ci
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFE
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdrequire the agent to read CI logs and pull request diffs, which can be influenced by external contributors. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify explicit delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the untrusted log content.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted permissions to post PR comments (
pull-requests: write) and can be configured to commit directly to the repository (contents: write). - Sanitization: The 'Verify-Before-Persist' rule acts as a primary safeguard, ensuring that a patch is only considered 'verified' if it allows the failing CI check to pass upon re-execution.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation and workflow examples reference the installation of the
gh-awextension fromgithubnext/gh-aw. This is a recognized organization (GitHub Next) providing legitimate developer tools. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow examples in
references/workflow-example.mdinclude shell commands for applying patches (git apply) and running local verification scripts. These commands are executed within the controlled environment of a CI runner. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill follows security best practices by using GitHub Secrets (
secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN,secrets.HEAL_PUSH_TOKEN) to manage sensitive access tokens, rather than hardcoding credentials.
Audit Metadata