self-improvement
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a feedback loop where data from untrusted sources (such as error logs and user-provided corrections) is captured in
.learnings/*.mdfiles and promoted to project instructions likeCLAUDE.md. This ingestion and promotion process creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if malicious instructions are embedded in the captured data.\n - Ingestion points: User feedback, shell error messages, and existing log files in
.learnings/(SKILL.md).\n - Boundary markers: Uses Markdown headers and sections (e.g.,
### Summary,### Details) to delimit data.\n - Capability inventory:
scripts/extract-skill.shfor file creation and instructions to modify project configuration files.\n - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the content within the learning entries before promotion.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains shell scripts used for workflow automation.\n
scripts/extract-skill.shscaffolds new skill folders and files. It includes robust regex validation (^[a-z0-9]+(-[a-z0-9]+)*$) for the skill name input to prevent command injection.\nscripts/activator.shandscripts/error-detector.shprovide diagnostic reminders and fail safely.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Installation documentation (references/installation.md) directs users to download the skill from the vendor's GitHub repository (pskoett/pskoett-ai-skills).
Audit Metadata