processflow-app

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the user to provide an authenticated curl command containing sensitive credentials, including an apikey and a Bearer token. These secrets are processed by the local tool to manage session authentication.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions require the user to execute a local Python script (app.py) to start the ProcessFlow Review Tool at http://localhost:8765, which then manages local file state and network requests.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external, untrusted data in the form of workshop transcripts and process definitions, creating a potential attack surface for indirect injection.
  • Ingestion points: Transcripts are pasted directly into the agent context; process data is fetched from the ProcessFlow API.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the transcripts are provided.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands, interact with a local web application, and perform write operations on production data through the Chrome MCP extension.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not define any sanitization or validation logic for the ingested transcript text.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The underlying tool uses the system curl utility to fetch process information, scores, and reports from external API endpoints during the ingestion flow.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 7, 2026, 06:39 AM