processflow-app
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the user to provide an authenticated
curlcommand containing sensitive credentials, including anapikeyand aBearertoken. These secrets are processed by the local tool to manage session authentication. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions require the user to execute a local Python script (
app.py) to start the ProcessFlow Review Tool athttp://localhost:8765, which then manages local file state and network requests. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external, untrusted data in the form of workshop transcripts and process definitions, creating a potential attack surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: Transcripts are pasted directly into the agent context; process data is fetched from the ProcessFlow API.
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the transcripts are provided.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands, interact with a local web application, and perform write operations on production data through the Chrome MCP extension.
- Sanitization: The skill does not define any sanitization or validation logic for the ingested transcript text.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The underlying tool uses the system
curlutility to fetch process information, scores, and reports from external API endpoints during the ingestion flow.
Audit Metadata