letterly-automation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
workflow.pyscript executes an external Python file located at a hardcoded absolute path (/Users/rami/Documents/life-os/ai-agents-config/skills/obsidian-semantic-linker/scripts/link_notes.py). This allows the execution of code that is not part of the audited skill bundle, which could be modified by other processes or users. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of
subprocess.runto orchestrate various Python scripts and browser automation tools, providing a wide surface for potential command injection if parameters were to be influenced by external data. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: In
exporter.py, the skill uses a shared browser context directory viaget_shared_context_path(). This practice can lead to the exposure of sensitive login sessions, cookies, and other personal data if the browser profile is shared across different agent tasks or applications. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
processor.pyscript processes transcription data from an external CSV file and writes it directly into markdown files without sanitizing the content. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface. - Ingestion points:
scripts/processor.pyreads data from exported CSV files. - Boundary markers: Uses markdown frontmatter (---) but lacks explicit instructions for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the transcription body.
- Capability inventory:
workflow.pycan execute arbitrary commands viasubprocess.run;processor.pyandlinker.pyperform filesystem write operations. - Sanitization: Filenames are sanitized for illegal characters, but the transcription content itself is not validated or filtered.
Audit Metadata