letterly-automation

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The workflow.py script executes an external Python file located at a hardcoded absolute path (/Users/rami/Documents/life-os/ai-agents-config/skills/obsidian-semantic-linker/scripts/link_notes.py). This allows the execution of code that is not part of the audited skill bundle, which could be modified by other processes or users.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of subprocess.run to orchestrate various Python scripts and browser automation tools, providing a wide surface for potential command injection if parameters were to be influenced by external data.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: In exporter.py, the skill uses a shared browser context directory via get_shared_context_path(). This practice can lead to the exposure of sensitive login sessions, cookies, and other personal data if the browser profile is shared across different agent tasks or applications.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The processor.py script processes transcription data from an external CSV file and writes it directly into markdown files without sanitizing the content. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/processor.py reads data from exported CSV files.
  • Boundary markers: Uses markdown frontmatter (---) but lacks explicit instructions for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the transcription body.
  • Capability inventory: workflow.py can execute arbitrary commands via subprocess.run; processor.py and linker.py perform filesystem write operations.
  • Sanitization: Filenames are sanitized for illegal characters, but the transcription content itself is not validated or filtered.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 18, 2026, 03:23 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — letterly-automation