blender-3d

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a Python helper function bake_and_replace_driver that uses exec() to dynamically set properties on Blender objects. This pattern is often used for automation but carries risk if the input string is not strictly controlled.
  • Evidence in SKILL.md: exec(f"target.{data_path} = {values[i]}") in the bake_and_replace_driver function.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using curl to send Python scripts to a local Blender process.
  • Evidence in SKILL.md: curl -s localhost:5656 --data-binary @- <<'PYEOF' used as the primary communication method.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a vulnerability surface where user-controlled input (such as property names or data paths) could reach a dynamic execution context (exec) if the agent follows the provided helper templates without adding its own validation logic.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided object names, property paths, or animation data processed by the agent in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions for the agent to treat user-provided names as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute arbitrary Python code within the Blender environment (via the curl to localhost mechanism), which has access to system modules like os and subprocess.
  • Sanitization: The provided Python example does not include sanitization or validation for the data_path variable before it is interpolated into the exec() call.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 6, 2026, 03:22 AM