blender-3d
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a Python helper function
bake_and_replace_driverthat usesexec()to dynamically set properties on Blender objects. This pattern is often used for automation but carries risk if the input string is not strictly controlled. - Evidence in
SKILL.md:exec(f"target.{data_path} = {values[i]}")in thebake_and_replace_driverfunction. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using
curlto send Python scripts to a local Blender process. - Evidence in
SKILL.md:curl -s localhost:5656 --data-binary @- <<'PYEOF'used as the primary communication method. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a vulnerability surface where user-controlled input (such as property names or data paths) could reach a dynamic execution context (
exec) if the agent follows the provided helper templates without adding its own validation logic. - Ingestion points: User-provided object names, property paths, or animation data processed by the agent in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions for the agent to treat user-provided names as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute arbitrary Python code within the Blender environment (via the
curltolocalhostmechanism), which has access to system modules likeosandsubprocess. - Sanitization: The provided Python example does not include sanitization or validation for the
data_pathvariable before it is interpolated into theexec()call.
Audit Metadata