orchestrator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill manages agent teams by executing various CLI tools including
gitfor repository management,herdrfor pane and agent control,vercelfor deployment operations, andclaudefor relaying messages via one-shot sessions. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill reads agent session transcripts from
~/.claude/projects/and~/.codex/sessions/using thescripts/ctx.shscript to monitor token usage and context window consumption. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The orchestrator logic ingests reports and plans from multiple sub-agents, which may include untrusted or sandboxed sessions, creating a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Reads teammate reports from
.agents/tmp/files, repository-level instructions (AGENTS.md,CLAUDE.md), and cross-session messages. - Boundary markers: Mentions the use of unique markers for certain message relays but lacks a comprehensive strategy for delimiting all external input.
- Capability inventory: Possesses significant capabilities including file system modification, subprocess execution of management tools, and deployment via external services.
- Sanitization: Does not specify methods for sanitizing or validating the content of sub-agent reports before they are used to drive the orchestration logic.
Audit Metadata