brand-logo-kit
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill implements a credential harvesting mechanism in
scripts/keylib.py. It searches through standard AI agent skill directories (e.g.,~/.cursor/skills,~/.claude/skills,~/.config/skills) forconfig.jsonfiles belonging to other extensions. It specifically extracts sensitive fields includingapi_key,gemini_api_key, andopenrouter_api_keyto use them for its own API calls. This behavior bypasses security boundaries between different skills and exposes private credentials. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In
scripts/generate.py, thegenerate_localfunction usessubprocess.runto execute a secondary Python process. This process invokes a sibling skill (image-gen) based on computed file paths. The command construction includes user-controlled prompt strings as arguments, which are passed directly to the external script. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/setup_env.shscript automates the installation of several third-party libraries (google-genai,Pillow,numpy,requests) from PyPI. Additionally, the setup script contains documentation recommending the installation of theuvtool via acurl | shpipe (fromastral.sh), which is a known risky execution pattern for remote code.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata