fastify-workflows

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill guides the maintenance of workflows that ingest untrusted data from GitHub pull requests, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent/workflow context via github.event.pull_request metadata, including the contributor's login, repository name, and branch names in plugins-ci.yml and reusable-release.yml.
  • Boundary markers: The skill explicitly instructs developers to use boundary markers by binding inputs to environment variables (env:) rather than using direct interpolation (${{ inputs.* }}) in shell scripts, which reduces the risk of malicious input executing code.
  • Capability inventory: The workflows have significant capabilities, including the ability to write to the repository (contents: write), publish to npm via OIDC (id-token: write), and execute arbitrary shell commands in the runner environment.
  • Sanitization: The skill mandates sanitization practices, such as validating the BUMP_TYPE input against a strict allowlist (patch, minor, major) and using printf to safely handle environment variables in shell commands.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documents the installation of the Yarn package manager from a remote source.
  • Evidence: references/ci-workflows.md describes installing Yarn via https://yarnpkg.com/install.sh and executing it with bash.
  • Context: This is a standard installation method for Yarn 1.x targeting a well-known, official service domain (yarnpkg.com).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 17, 2026, 07:20 AM