pushing-commits-to-the-repo
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to read and triage pull request comments from both humans and bots as part of its core loop. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where an attacker could place malicious instructions inside a PR comment intended to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: GitHub PR comments processed during the triage loop (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify using delimiters or ignoring instructions embedded within the comments.
- Capability inventory: GitHub CLI (
gh) for labeling and editing PRs, and thepre-push-reviewlocal command. - Sanitization: Absent. There are no instructions to sanitize or validate the content of the comments before the agent processes or replies to them.
Audit Metadata