dmux-workflows
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes local scripts (
scripts/orchestrate-worktrees.jsandscripts/orchestrate-codex-worker.sh) to automate the creation of tmux panes and launch agent sessions. These scripts use template-based command construction (e.g.,codex exec --cwd {worktree_path} --task-file {task_file}) which can be vulnerable to command injection if the variables are populated from unsanitized external data. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation encourages the installation of
dmuxfrom a third-party GitHub repository (github.com/standardagents/dmux). Although it includes a disclaimer for user review, this represents a potential supply chain risk as the tool is necessary for the skill's primary functionality but resides outside of verified organization namespaces. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: An indirect prompt injection surface exists in the orchestration workflow. The
plan.jsonfile defines thetaskstrings that are passed to sub-agents. If an attacker can influence this file—such as via a malicious pull request—they could inject instructions that the parallel agents would then follow with the full context and capabilities of those harnesses. - Ingestion points:
plan.json(task descriptions and launcher commands). - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the sub-agent tasks.
- Capability inventory: The sub-agents mentioned (Claude Code, Codex, Cline) typically have extensive file system and shell execution capabilities.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the task descriptions or command templates is mentioned in the workflow documentation.
Audit Metadata