automate-me
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and reads sensitive agent transcript files stored in platform-specific directories outside the immediate workspace root.
- Evidence:
- Instructions in
SKILL.mdto locate and read session logs from~/.claude/projects/,~/.cursor/projects/,~/.pi/agent/sessions/, and~/.codex/sessions/. - These files contain the full history of user interactions with AI agents, which is considered highly sensitive personal/professional data.
- Context: The skill intends to use this data for personalization, but reading session logs across platform boundaries is a high-privilege operation.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted historical data (past chat transcripts) to generate new agent instructions, creating a risk that malicious patterns in the logs could be promoted into a permanent skill.
- Ingestion points: JSONL transcript files containing chat history (Step 1 in
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not specify how to distinguish between legitimate user preferences and potentially malicious or accidental instructions embedded in the chat logs.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
create-skillfor file creation and Git for committing/proposing changes (Step 4 and 6 inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization or safety filtering is applied to the mined patterns before they are used to draft the final skill output.
Audit Metadata