interrogate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a code reviewer, ingesting untrusted code (diffs and file contents) and user-provided intent statements which are then interpolated into subagent prompts. This creates a standard surface for indirect prompt injection where the code being reviewed could attempt to influence the reviewer's output.
- Ingestion points: Step 1 in
SKILL.md(collecting diffs/files) and the{DIFF_OR_FILES}and{INTENT}placeholders inreferences/reviewer-prompt.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not use specific delimiters or structured wrappers (like XML tags) to isolate the untrusted code from the instructions in the reviewer prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill restricts subagents with
readonly: trueand the lead agent explicitly states "Do NOT auto-apply changes," ensuring a human-in-the-loop workflow. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the ingested code or intent text is performed before interpolation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local shell commands to gather the necessary context for the review.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdexecutesgit diff main...HEADto identify the changes requiring review. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill reads specific configuration files from the user's home directory to determine model preferences.
- Evidence: Step 3 in
SKILL.mdreads~/.cursor/rules/pstack-models.mdcand~/.agents/pstack-models.mdfor reviewer configuration.
Audit Metadata