ouroboros-run
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMOBFUSCATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [OBFUSCATION]: The instructions direct the agent to locate and decode Base64-encoded payloads hidden within HTML comments inside tool responses (e.g.,
<!-- ouroboros-job-observer-v1 base64 <payload> -->). While used for 'transport integrity', this pattern involves acting on hidden, non-human-readable data. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the decoded Base64 payloads as configuration contracts to spawn and control independent sub-agents (using
spawn_agent,OMP Task, orTask/Agentprimitives) which operate autonomously to monitor jobs. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands including
ouroboros tui openfor launching a dashboard andgitcommands (e.g.,git checkout -b) for automatic feature branch management. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The agent is instructed to read local configuration files, specifically
~/.ouroboros/config.yamland project-levelCLAUDE.md, to determine behavior and policy settings. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests external data (YAML seed content and tool output payloads) and possesses high-privilege capabilities such as shell execution and sub-agent spawning, creating an attack surface for instructions embedded in processed data.
- Ingestion points: User-provided YAML seeds, tool output comments (
job_observer), and local configuration files (CLAUDE.md,~/.ouroboros/config.yaml). - Boundary markers: The skill requires 'canonical v1 validation' for the Base64 payload, which acts as a structural boundary, but no explicit boundary markers are defined for the primary YAML seed input.
- Capability inventory: Sub-agent spawning, shell command execution, git workflow automation, and persistent background job monitoring.
- Sanitization: Employs validation logic for the observer contract payload but does not mention sanitization for the main seed specification content.
Audit Metadata