brand-context

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains strong behavioral instructions that urge the agent to override 'caution' and produce output regardless of thin inputs. Specifically, it states: 'Refusing to produce a draft is a failure of this skill, not caution.' While intended to ensure task completion, this language instructs the agent to bypass internal refusal mechanisms.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external URLs (via WebFetch) and user-supplied files (via Read) and writes this data into context files stored in the knowledge/ directory. This creates a surface where malicious instructions in external sources could influence the behavior of other marketing skills that read these files.
  • Ingestion points: External website URLs (Mode 2) and local files/folders (Mode 2) via WebFetch and Read tools.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses template placeholders like [TEMPLATE], [NEEDS INPUT], and [UNVERIFIED] to distinguish drafted content, but lacks explicit security boundaries for raw external content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses cp (shell command) to initialize directories and writes markdown files to the local filesystem (knowledge/ subfolders).
  • Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization of content fetched from external URLs before it is drafted into the brand context files, though user review is required before final writing.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to execute a shell command cp -r ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/assets/knowledge ./knowledge to initialize the project structure. While this is a local utility function for project setup, it involves direct shell interaction.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 4, 2026, 06:28 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — brand-context