md-to-confluence
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
md-to-confluence.pyusessubprocess.runto execute thepandocbinary for converting markdown to HTML. While this is the intended functionality, it involves passing local file paths to a subprocess. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
confluence-preflight.pyscript usessubprocess.runto call a sibling script (confluence-to-md.py) to fetch remote content for conflict detection. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile provides a Python one-liner in the 'Post-push verification' section for the agent to execute viapython3 -c. This script dynamically accesses sensitive credentials from environment variables (CONFLUENCE_TOKEN) and performs network requests to verify page status. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted markdown data and remote Confluence content while having the capability to perform network operations and execute shell commands.
- Ingestion points:
md-to-confluence.pyandconfluence-preflight.pyread local markdown files and fetch page content from the Confluence REST API. - Boundary markers: The skill does not use specific delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from following directives embedded in the markdown files.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
subprocess.runto execute external tools, performs network operations viahttp.client, and writes snapshot files to the local filesystem. - Sanitization: The skill performs regex-based transformations to convert HTML to Confluence storage format but does not sanitize content against prompt injection instructions.
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