evaluating-llms-harness
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous shell commands and Python snippets that use
os.system()to invoke thelm_evalCLI for running model evaluations. Evidence inSKILL.md: workflow examples useos.system()to execute evaluation scripts during training loops. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The harness utilizes a custom task system using the
!functionYAML tag to execute arbitrary Python code defined in a localutils.pyfile. Evidence inreferences/custom-tasks.md: configuration examples includeprocess_docs: !function utils.process_docsand `metric_list: - metric: !function utils.execute_code`.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest external benchmark datasets (e.g., from HuggingFace or local files), creating a surface where malicious instructions in the data could influence the agent or the model being evaluated. Ingestion points: external datasets specified via
dataset_pathin task configurations (e.g.,SKILL.md,references/custom-tasks.md). Boundary markers: uses Jinja2 templates (doc_to_text) to structure inputs, but these lack robust protection against embedded instructions. Capability inventory: the skill documents the use ofos.system()and the--allow_code_executionflag for executing model-generated code during benchmarks. Sanitization: relies on basic filters and the internal logic of thelm-evaluation-harnessframework.
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