guidance

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides multiple implementation examples (found in SKILL.md and references/examples.md) that utilize the Python eval() function to process strings generated by a Large Language Model. Specifically, the 'ReAct Agent' examples define a calculator tool as lambda expr: eval(expr), where expr is directly sourced from model generation via gen('action_input'). This pattern is high-risk as it allows for arbitrary code execution on the host system if the model is influenced by malicious input.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents architectural patterns for building agents that ingest untrusted external data and pass it into templates with high-privilege execution capabilities like eval().\n
  • Ingestion points: Agent templates in SKILL.md and references/examples.md ingest raw text through parameters like question and text.\n
  • Boundary markers: The provided examples do not demonstrate the use of delimiters or specific safety instructions to prevent the agent from executing commands embedded within the processed external data.\n
  • Capability inventory: The documented templates include an eval()-based calculator tool, providing an exploitable capability surface for any instructions extracted from the input.\n
  • Sanitization: The documentation does not demonstrate sanitization or strict validation of the input data or the resulting model-generated tool arguments before they reach the eval() function.\n- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill exhibits inconsistent authorship metadata, declaring 'Orchestra Research' in the YAML frontmatter of SKILL.md while being associated with the author 'qcmuu' in the skill's deployment context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 9, 2026, 07:07 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — guidance