guidance
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides multiple implementation examples (found in
SKILL.mdandreferences/examples.md) that utilize the Pythoneval()function to process strings generated by a Large Language Model. Specifically, the 'ReAct Agent' examples define a calculator tool aslambda expr: eval(expr), whereexpris directly sourced from model generation viagen('action_input'). This pattern is high-risk as it allows for arbitrary code execution on the host system if the model is influenced by malicious input.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents architectural patterns for building agents that ingest untrusted external data and pass it into templates with high-privilege execution capabilities likeeval().\n - Ingestion points: Agent templates in
SKILL.mdandreferences/examples.mdingest raw text through parameters likequestionandtext.\n - Boundary markers: The provided examples do not demonstrate the use of delimiters or specific safety instructions to prevent the agent from executing commands embedded within the processed external data.\n
- Capability inventory: The documented templates include an
eval()-based calculator tool, providing an exploitable capability surface for any instructions extracted from the input.\n - Sanitization: The documentation does not demonstrate sanitization or strict validation of the input data or the resulting model-generated tool arguments before they reach the
eval()function.\n- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill exhibits inconsistent authorship metadata, declaring 'Orchestra Research' in the YAML frontmatter ofSKILL.mdwhile being associated with the author 'qcmuu' in the skill's deployment context.
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