llama-factory
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The documentation in
references/getting_started.mdprovides instructions for system-level administrative tasks, such as usingsudoto uninstall CUDA drivers (sudo /usr/local/cuda-12.1/bin/cuda-uninstaller). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill guides the user and agent through executing various command-line operations using
llamafactory-cli,torchrun, andaccelerateto manage model training and inference. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines workflows for ingesting and processing untrusted external datasets for fine-tuning, which presents an attack surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in the training data.
- Ingestion points: User-provided datasets in Alpaca, ShareGPT, and KTO formats as described in
references/getting_started.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specific instructions or delimiters provided to prevent the agent from being influenced by instructions contained within the datasets.
- Capability inventory: The skill instructions facilitate shell execution via the
llamafactory-cliand script execution for training and evaluation. - Sanitization: Absent; the documentation does not mention validation or filtering of input dataset content.
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