nav-deep-research
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process large volumes of untrusted data from the public internet, creating a significant attack surface.
- Ingestion points: The
source_store.pyscript fetches content from external URLs usingWebSearchandWebFetchtools. - Boundary markers: The implementation includes a dedicated security fence system in
untrusted.py, wrapping all fetched content in<nav-untrusted-source>tags with a clear preamble instructing the agent to treat the content as data only. - Capability inventory: The skill environment includes
Bashfor workflow orchestration,WebSearchandWebFetchfor data retrieval, andTaskfor spawning subagents. - Sanitization: Fetched HTML is parsed for plain text in
source_store.py, anduntrusted.pyincludes deterministic logic to neutralize forged fence tags encountered within the external data to prevent boundary escapes. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several test files, including
test_research_run.py,test_ship_gate.py, andtest_source_store.py, utilize thesubprocessmodule. These calls are standard development practices used to execute the skill's own CLI tools within a controlled unit testing environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses the standard Python
urlliblibrary insource_store.pyto retrieve research materials from the web. These operations are core to the skill's research function, and the fetched content is handled safely via the fencing system. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Automated scanners flagged potential remote code execution due to the combination of network downloads and subprocess calls in the same files. A manual audit confirms these are false positives; the downloads in
source_store.pypopulate data notes that are never executed, and the subprocess calls in the test suite only run the skill's own implementation for validation purposes.
Audit Metadata