opencli-usage
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documents the
opencli plugin install github:user/repocommand, which allows the agent to download and execute arbitrary code from any GitHub repository. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
opencli external registercommand enables the definition of custom installation strings, such asnpm i -g my-tool, which are executed directly in the shell. This allows for arbitrary command execution under the guise of tool registration. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to download and install the primary tool from an untrusted NPM package (
@jackwener/opencli) and GitHub repository (github.com/jackwener/OpenCLI). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Several tool strategies (
COOKIE,INTERCEPT,UI) and theopencli browser bindcommand are designed to capture and use sensitive session cookies from the user's browser. This capability allows an agent to access private authenticated sessions and potentially exfiltrate session data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as an interface for extracting data from external websites through
opencli browser extractor site-specific adapters. This creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection, as malicious instructions embedded in a target website's content could influence agent behavior. There are no documented boundary markers or sanitization procedures for this ingested data, while the agent maintains high-impact capabilities like shell execution and cookie access.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata