paper-slide-deck
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/generate-slides.pyutilizessubprocess.check_callto execute shell commands. It specifically runspip install google-genaiat runtime to ensure the Gemini API client is available. Executing arbitrary commands via shell wrappers is a high-risk capability that can be exploited if arguments are not strictly controlled. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's workflow involves the runtime installation of the
google-genaiPython library. While the library originates from a known provider, dynamic dependency management at execution time bypasses standard security vetting of the environment and introduces potential supply chain vulnerabilities. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface as it processes external, untrusted documents to generate slides.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through user-provided academic papers (PDFs) and Markdown files (e.g.,
source-paper.pdf,source.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters or provide 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the content analysis phase.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities, including file system writes across multiple scripts and network access for image generation via the Gemini API.
- Sanitization: Absent. Content extracted from the source documents is directly interpolated into prompts for the image generation model without escaping or validation.
Audit Metadata