paper-slide-deck

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 26, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/generate-slides.py utilizes subprocess.check_call to execute shell commands. It specifically runs pip install google-genai at runtime to ensure the Gemini API client is available. Executing arbitrary commands via shell wrappers is a high-risk capability that can be exploited if arguments are not strictly controlled.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's workflow involves the runtime installation of the google-genai Python library. While the library originates from a known provider, dynamic dependency management at execution time bypasses standard security vetting of the environment and introduces potential supply chain vulnerabilities.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface as it processes external, untrusted documents to generate slides.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through user-provided academic papers (PDFs) and Markdown files (e.g., source-paper.pdf, source.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters or provide 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the content analysis phase.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities, including file system writes across multiple scripts and network access for image generation via the Gemini API.
  • Sanitization: Absent. Content extracted from the source documents is directly interpolated into prompts for the image generation model without escaping or validation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 26, 2026, 07:58 PM