elevenlabs-stt
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to install the
belt-sh/clipackage via npx and references external installation guides fromraw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills. These sources are not verified vendors. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow is centered around the
belt app runcommand, which downloads and executes logic for transcription and alignment models from theinference.shplatform at runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute shell commands using thebeltCLI. This involves authenticated sessions (belt login) and execution of applications that interact with both local files and remote URLs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Audio data via external URLs and narration text provided in the
inputparameters of theelevenlabs-sttandelevenlabs-forced-alignmenttools. - Boundary markers: None identified; the skill does not instruct the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the transcribed text or input data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bashand can write output to files (e.g.,transcript.json). - Sanitization: No evidence of escaping or filtering logic is present for the data processed by the external transcription models.
- Ingestion points: Audio data via external URLs and narration text provided in the
Audit Metadata