javascript-sdk
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation includes instructions for installing external software, specifically the
@inferencesh/sdknpm package and thebelt-sh/cliskill, which are used to interact with the platform services.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is granted permissions viaallowed-toolsto runnpm,npx,node,pnpm, andyarn. This enables the agent to perform local environment setup and execute JavaScript code, which could be misused if the agent is compromised by external data.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Documentation examples inreferences/tool-builder.mdandreferences/agent-patterns.mddemonstrate processing tool arguments usingeval(). While presented as examples for a calculator tool, this pattern promotes unsafe execution of arbitrary strings which can lead to code injection vulnerabilities if implemented by users without strict sanitization.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture supports building agents that process data from external, untrusted sources (e.g., via web search, webhooks, or third-party apps), creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.\n - Ingestion points: External data enters through tools like
webhookToolorinternalTools().webSearch()as shown inreferences/tool-builder.md.\n - Boundary markers: There are no examples of using boundary markers or specific negative constraints to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within processed data.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill allows high-privilege operations including shell access (via frontmatter), file system writes (
references/files.md), and outbound network requests.\n - Sanitization: The provided code snippets do not include logic for sanitizing or escaping content retrieved from external sources before it is interpreted by the agent.
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