ai-image-generation

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external resources for setup and installation.
  • Fetches installation instructions from a remote repository: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.md.
  • Instructs the user or agent to install a CLI tool using npx skills add belt-sh/cli.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to interact with the local system using the Bash tool to execute belt CLI commands.
  • Examples include belt login, belt app run <model> --input 'JSON', and belt app list.
  • The allowed-tools frontmatter correctly limits access to the Bash tool specifically for belt commands.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection through user-provided input.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided strings are used as prompts in the --input argument of shell commands (e.g., in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses single quotes and JSON formatting to delimit user input, which provides basic separation but may be bypassed by complex inputs containing single quotes.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via the Bash tool and perform network operations via the belt CLI.
  • Sanitization: There is no explicit evidence of sanitization or escaping logic within the instruction file for the interpolated prompt data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 2, 2026, 02:19 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ai-image-generation