landing-page-design

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external installation instructions and remote files hosted on GitHub.
  • Evidence: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.md referenced in SKILL.md.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the user to install third-party CLI tools and agent extensions from external repositories.
  • Evidence: npx skills add belt-sh/cli and npx skills add inference-sh/skills@... commands in SKILL.md.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the belt CLI to execute remote applications, facilitating interactions with external APIs and services.
  • Evidence: Multiple instances of belt app run targeting remote models like falai/flux-dev-lora and tavily/search-assistant.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection by interpolating user-provided text into shell commands for remote execution.
  • Ingestion points: Prompt fields within the --input parameters of belt app run commands.
  • Boundary markers: None; external inputs are directly included in JSON command payloads.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is configured to allow Bash(belt *) execution.
  • Sanitization: No input validation or escaping mechanisms are described for the processed text.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 2, 2026, 02:19 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — landing-page-design