landing-page-design
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external installation instructions and remote files hosted on GitHub.
- Evidence:
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.mdreferenced inSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the user to install third-party CLI tools and agent extensions from external repositories.
- Evidence:
npx skills add belt-sh/cliandnpx skills add inference-sh/skills@...commands inSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
beltCLI to execute remote applications, facilitating interactions with external APIs and services. - Evidence: Multiple instances of
belt app runtargeting remote models likefalai/flux-dev-loraandtavily/search-assistant. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection by interpolating user-provided text into shell commands for remote execution.
- Ingestion points: Prompt fields within the
--inputparameters ofbelt app runcommands. - Boundary markers: None; external inputs are directly included in JSON command payloads.
- Capability inventory: The skill is configured to allow
Bash(belt *)execution. - Sanitization: No input validation or escaping mechanisms are described for the processed text.
Audit Metadata